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Assessing Institutional Determinants of MP Behaviour:
Survey Data from the Baltic States*
VELLO PETTAI**
Department of Political Science, University of Tartu
Abstract: To what extent do electoral and legislative institutions affect the behav-
iour of parliamentarians in new democracies? This article examines this question
on the basis of a wide-ranging survey of MPs in the Baltic states from January
2000. Given substantial differences in the types of institutions existing in the
three states, the research tests whether these differences are reflected in MPs’ re-
sponses to key questions about their relationship to and interaction with (1) par-
liamentary work, (2) their party and faction, (3) individual voters, (4) the interests
of their district or constituency, and (5) interest groups. The results corroborate a
number of existing theoretical postulates, while leaving unconfirmed others.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3: 461–486
In the consolidating democracies of Central and Eastern Europe it is a truism that
one of the central dimensions of this process is the development of a healthy par-
liamentary democracy. More specifically, this question concerns the myriad roles
parliamentary deputies are expected to fulfil in relation to voters, parties, interest
groups, other state institutions, the media, foreign counterparts, etc. In some cases,
these roles involve interest mediation, in other cases interest arbitration, and in
others oversight and supervision. All of these roles take time to mature, not only on-
the part of the MPs, but also in the case of other players. The entire web of relations
quickly becomes impossible to grasp all at once. Still, the steady consolidation of
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s has generated clear
proof that these relations exist and are to a considerable degree functioning. Al-
though actual popular satisfaction with democracy may vary between countries, the
minimum requirements of democratic constitutionalism and respect for fundamen-
tal liberties continue to be upheld, not least because of the role(s) played by MPs.
Existing studies on the role of parliamentarians in the new democracies of Cen-
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tral and Eastern Europe have focused on elite recruitment and circulation [Higley and
Lengyel 2000; Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski 1998; Frantzel-Zagorskia and Wasi-
lewski 2000; Best and Cotta 2002] or on the institutionalisation of parliamentary in-
stitutions [Agh and Kurtan 1995] and in particular legislative committees [Olson and
Crowther 2002]. These studies have been important either for creating a sociological
portrait of the emerging political class in these countries or for examining how politi-
cians come to develop and work within a specific institutional system such as parlia-
mentary committees. Both of these aspects are significant for understanding how
democracy works, either in terms of how the professional skills and experiences of
actual MPs feed into the political process or how parliamentarians foster a culture of
rules and begin to abide by them in order to co-operate and compete peacefully. Yet
these studies fall short in two other important dimensions: (1) finding out how MPs
actually perceive their own work and (2) exploring the matrix (or crossfire) of influ-
ences, which parliamentarians see themselves as having to navigate when doing
their job.
This article will examine the state of these MP roles and relationships in three
new EU member states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It will report some of the
findings from a survey of MPs in the three countries. The survey, conducted in Jan-
uary 2000, contained over 130 questions relating to a wide range of political behav-
iours, including MPs’ personal political histories, party relations, electoral strate-
gies, parliamentary activities, and role interpretations. The survey represents only a
snapshot in time (time series data are as yet unavailable) and the data bear the lim-
itations of any survey of MPs, including the limited sample size, the political sensi-
tivity of certain questions, the particularities of any given parliamentary cohort, en-
vironmental influences from exogenous political events, etc. Nevertheless, the data
make it possible to establish a baseline of MP behaviour in the Baltic states as an ex-
ample of the regional development of parliamentary democracy, but also with re-
gard to certain institutional variables, which the Baltic states represent particularly
well. With regard to the first goal, I argue that MP behaviour appears to be essen-
tially party-centred in the sense that MPs are bound first and foremost to their par-
ty, and less so to voters, interest groups or other political actors. Second, I argue that
institutional variables – and in particular electoral institutions – do not appear to
have an immediate or unequivocal impact on MP behaviour. For example, more cen-
tralised (i.e. party-centred) electoral systems do not appear to promote more cen-
tralised political behaviour. On the contrary, in this survey, it was in Latvia, which
has the most centralised electoral system, that MPs were the most concerned about
addressing constituent and interest group concerns. 
The article begins with a short methodological section outlining the parameters
of this survey and the essential elements of each country’s electoral and political sys-
tem. This is followed by data on five different role situations that Baltic MPs en-
counter, i.e. their relationship to and interaction with (1) parliamentary work, (2) their
party and faction, (3) individual voters, (4) the interests of their district or constituen-
cy, and (5) interest groups. It is not the aim of these sections to provide any extensive
interpretation, which is instead contained in the analysis in the final section.
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Methodological and institutional dimensions
The survey results reported in this paper are part of a broader research project ex-
amining the links between political institutions and party cohesion in consolidating
democracies. Many of the hypotheses tested in the survey stem from previous work
on these institutional frameworks done by Pettai and Kreuzer.1 The questionnaire
used in the survey was conceived in the tradition of a number of surveys that have
been conducted among representatives in the US Congress and MPs in the British
House of Commons. In many cases, questions were drawn directly from these sur-
veys in order to facilitate future cross-national comparisons. The survey took place
in most cases as an elite interview, although on occasion the parliamentarians pre-
ferred to fill out the questionnaires on their own. The fieldwork was carried out in
January 2000 by three of the most reputable polling organisations2 in the Baltic
states, and the survey was coordinated with the help of legislative officials and lo-
cal scholars in all three countries.3
The survey’s representative sample was of particular value. In each parliament
a minimum 70% response rate was set as the goal, and in each case this figure was
achieved. In addition, the results were commensurate with the parties’ strength in
parliament (see Table 1). In terms of parliamentary cycles, Estonia’s was the youngest
group (elected in March 1999), followed by Latvia (October 1998) and Lithuania (Oc-
tober 1996). This factor played out differently in each country, as Estonian deputies
were able to answer questions regarding electioneering strategies with the freshest
experience, while Lithuanian deputies had the longest time-perspective with regard
to legislative activity. Nonetheless, given that in each country a sizeable number of
respondents (44.3%) were either second- or even third-term parliamentarians, the
collective experience of deputies helped to counter some of these cyclical aspects.
One drawback of the survey was the fact that limited financial resources pre-
vented the project from interviewing any politicians other than parliamentary
deputies. For questions regarding electoral career control and electioneering, a
broader sample of electoral candidates, including those not necessarily elected to
parliament, would have been better.4 Table 1 shows the relevant data based on the
survey’s parliamentary sample.
The Baltic states represent an interesting testing ground for patterns of MP be-
haviour because their electoral and political institutions differ considerably.5 Al-
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1 See Pettai [2000], Pettai and Kreuzer [1999; 2001], Kreuzer and Pettai [2004].
2 In Estonia, Saar Poll; in Latvia, Baltic Data House; in Lithuania, the Social Information Cen-
tre.
3 Artis Pabriks (Vidzeme University College) and Darious Zeruolis (Vilnius University)
served as local liaisons in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively. The author coordinated work in
Estonia.
4 Work in this field regarding Estonian parties has been done by Kangur [2004].
5 For a more detailed overview of these institutions, see Pettai and Kreuzer [1999], Mikkel and
Pettai [2004].
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Table 1. Survey sample data, N
Country                                                   Representation in                      Number of
Party parliament based on the             deputies surveyed
most recent election results
prior to the survey
1. Estonia
Centre Party 28 20
Fatherland Union 18 11
Reform Party 18 11
Moderates 17 10
Coalition Party 7 5
People’s Union 7 7




People’s Party 24 18
Latvia’s Way* 21 11







Social Democrats 14 13
New Party 8 3
TOTAL 100 71
3. Lithuania
Homeland Union 70 52
Christian Democratic Party 16 11
Centre Union 14 13
Democratic Labour Party 12 12
Social Democrats 12 7




** Includes one deputy who gave party affiliation as ‘LW Ally’.







though all three countries regained their independence simultaneously from the So-
viet Union in 1991 and all three shared the legacy of fifty years of Soviet rule, they
each went on to adopt radically different institutional frameworks, which as a result
provide a unique opportunity to study the effects of different institutions on politi-
cal behaviour under relatively similar economic and social conditions. For example,
Estonia has a relatively personalised PR electoral system, in which candidates run
as individuals and can be elected directly from their district if they fulfil a minimum
(Hare) vote quota. However, at the same time all candidates are also on a national
list, which is used to allocate all remaining seats that are not won immediately at the
district level.6 Generally in Estonian elections, roughly half of the mandates are ac-
corded at the district level, the other half at the national list level. As a result, Es-
tonian politicians play a dual game, running in their districts as individual candi-
dates, while at the national level they are bound to their ranking on the party list.7
Constitutionally, Estonia has a parliamentary form of government. Although the
system also includes a president, the office is largely ceremonial and the president
is elected either by parliament or by an electoral college, not by popular vote.
Latvia’s constitutional structure echoes Estonia’s in that it, too, has a parlia-
mentary form of government with a weak president chosen by parliament. At the
same time, Latvia’s electoral system is strictly PR, based on party lists nominated in
each of the country’s five electoral districts. As a result candidates are much more
closely linked to their party’s fortunes. Nevertheless, an element of uncertainty (or
candidate opportunity) also exists, to the extent that Latvian voters are allowed a
preference vote within the party list that they choose. Beside each candidate’s name,
voters can place either a ‘+’ or ‘-’ sign or leave it blank. In turn, any mandates that
the list receives in the district are awarded to individual candidates based on their
respective preference score. As a consequence, candidates have an opportunity for
personalistic campaigning by encouraging voters to approbate their own names,
while striking out fellow candidates on the party list. (Anecdotal evidence suggests
that this is a broad occurrence.)
Lithuania’s electoral system is one of the few hybrid systems in the world.8 Of
the Seimas’s 141 members 70 are elected through a single, nationwide multi-mem-
ber district (MMD) based on party lists and proportional representation with a 5%
voting threshold. The remaining seats are elected via 71 single-member districts
(SMDs) based on two rounds of voting.9 This creates another dual dynamic within
the political system, given that, although candidates can run on both levels, single-
Vello Pettai: Assessing Institutional Determinants of MP Behaviour
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6 A minimum 5% vote threshold also exists for parties to be eligible for seats at this third, na-
tional level of seat allocation.
7 This would seem to make Estonia almost a mixed electoral system, but it is not, as voters
only cast one ballot for an individual candidate at the district level. The catch is that these sin-
gle votes are simply amalgamated differently at each respective level of mandate distribution.
8 That said, the number of such systems is growing. See Shugart and Wattenberg [2001].
9 For the October 2000 elections, the two-round system was dropped and a single-round
‘first-past-the-post’ system was adopted. In 2004, the two-round system was restored.
member district campaigning tends to be much more personalistic.10 In addition,
once elected to parliament, party groups may be split between SMD and MMD
deputies, as their electoral interests may not always coincide. Finally, Lithuania’s
constitutional system is semi-presidential, wherein a popularly elected president
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3
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10 For a comparison of these different effects, see Moser [2004].
Table 2. ‘When parliament is in session, how time-consuming would you rate the following
activities?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia          Latvia         Lithuania Baltic average
1. Parliamentary activities
a) attending parliamentary debates 1.7647 1.9155 1.9907 1.9069
(.5496) (.7699) (.7298) (.7009)
b) working in standing parliamentary 
committees 1.6901 1.5352 1.4685 1.5494
(.5755) (.5300) (.5692) (.5657)
c) government oversight (preparing 
for question-time, investigative 
committees)
2.6522 2.6197 2.2909 2.4840
(.6603) (.8513) (.7083) (.7563)
d) meeting informally with other MPs 2.8169 2.2535 2.6415 2.5806
(.5427) (.7313) (.6353) (.6745)
2. Party activities
a) attending party meetings 
(e.g. faction, national board) 2.3662 2.2254 2.3458 2.3173
(.5914) (.7010) (.7282) (.6837)
b) attending local party meetings 2.8286 2.4000 2.3178 2.4858
(.7014) (.6895) (.6530) (.7091)
3. Voter concerns
a) helping local voters solve personal 
problems in dealing with 
the government
2.4648 2.2958 1.7838 2.1186
(.7138) (.7444) (.6523) (.7571)
4. District activities
a) holding constituency meetings 2.7571 2.2113 1.8649 2.2103
(.7506) (.5585) (.6535) (.7518)
5. Interest groups
a) meeting with interest groups 2.7571 2.2676 2.5701 2.5363
(.7310) (.6752) (.7538) (.7466)
1 = Very time-consuming, 4 = No attention required.
shares power with a parliament-appointed prime minister. Although the presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections are not concurrent, their dual existence adds yet an-
other dimension to party politics.
In each of these three institutional profiles, it is possible to see cross-cutting
institutional effects, which means that, on the whole, none of the countries repre-
sents an unambiguous type of institutional constellation. In terms of case selection
and research design, this would seem to pose a problem given the apparent impos-
sibility of clearly ranking the institutions in the three countries (as the independent
variable) in order to juxtapose them with the survey results (the dependent vari-
able). Nevertheless, the countries are very different in their institutional make-up
and I would argue that some of the countervailing aspects of one or another system
are not significant enough to override the general trend. In this respect, Lithuania
could be best classified as the most personalistic electoral system (because of its
SMD voting), Estonia semi-personalistic (because of its mix of district candidacies,
but also national-level party lists where roughly half of all deputies have gained
their seats) and Latvia least personalistic (because of its primary focus on party lists,
wherein preference votes come into play only secondarily).11 Certainly other re-
search designs are possible; however, the lack of readily available data precludes
making any such study for the time being.
Table 2 provides a general overview of how Baltic MPs assessed the structure of
their activities as parliamentarians across different parliamentary roles. In response to
the question “When parliament is in session, how time consuming would you rate the
following activities?”, deputies were given a list of nine activities, which were all re-
lated to work as an MP. The respondents’ answers were based on a four-point scale,
where 1 equals ‘very time-consuming’ and 4 equals ‘no attention required at all’.12
As one might imagine, parliamentary activities took up the most time among
Baltic MPs, and in particular work in parliamentary committees. General oversight
was a less demanding parliamentary role, although in Lithuania (where a large num-
ber of investigative committees were created during the 1990s) this figure was rela-
tively high, indeed surpassing that of party activities. Next among general cate-
gories was that of dealing directly with the personal problems of voters and with
electoral constituencies as a whole. It is worth making a distinction between these
two parliamentary roles since the first concerns engaging individually with citizens,
while the second relates to monitoring the interests of an entire electoral district. In
both of these areas, Lithuanian deputies were again ahead of their Baltic counter-
parts, and with respect to constituency care they outstripped Estonian MPs by al-
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11 These characterisations are based on a number of classic works on electoral systems, in-
cluding Grofman and Lijphart [1986], Katz [1980], Lijphart [1994], LeDuc, Niemi and Norris
[1996], and Cox [1997].
12 All of the scale questions in the survey were structured so that 1 equaled the highest and
4 equaled the lowest. Therefore, for all these questions, the lower the mean is, the higher the
respondent’s agreement with the statement or degree of involvement in the given question
category.
most a full point on the four-point scale. Thirdly, party activities also accounted for
a significant share of MPs’ time. This category includes attending both parliamen-
tary caucus meetings as well as in many cases other party meetings. For example,
a full 75.7% of the survey respondents reported also having held, at least once be-
fore, a formal position in their party (either at the national or the local level). Baltic
deputies showed the least interest in interest groups, stating 40% of the time that
dealing with these groups was not very time consuming. Nevertheless, this catego-
ry ranked considerably higher among Latvian deputies.
Parliamentary activities
As noted above, MPs often stand at the nexus of a number of cross-cutting influ-
ences and intersecting levels of political power. One such competing level is in-
volvement in local politics or civic organisations. In all three Baltic states parlia-
mentary deputies are allowed to simultaneously hold office at both the national and
the local legislative level. This French-style cumul de mandats means not only extra
work, but often also conflicting party-political interests, when local coalitions differ
from national ones. Estonia offers a particularly recent example, where an abrupt
shift in the coalition governing the capital Tallinn in December 2001 eventually led
to a collapse of the national government in favour of a similarly fashioned alterna-
tive coalition. The original centre-right coalition in Tallinn, involving mainly the na-
tionalist Pro Patria Union, the liberal Reform Party and the centrist Moderates,
broke up in December 2001, when the Reform Party decided to form a new majori-
ty with the leftish Centre Party. This sudden switch prompted the Pro Patria Union
and the Moderates to review the three-party coalition at the national level, and even-
tually Prime Minister Mart Laar (from the Pro Patria Union) decided to resign in
protest over the Reform Party’s behaviour. The Reform Party then went on to form
a national government with the Centre Party, thus completing the local-gone-na-
tional bouleversement. A major reason given by commentators for the political chain
reaction (or short-circuit) was the fact that many members of the Tallinn City Coun-
cil were also national MPs. As a result, once the capital’s legislature suffered a col-
lapse of confidence among its leading members, these strains had to reverberate at
the national level too.
Within the framework of this research, it has not as yet been possible to com-
pile precise data on the level of local office-holding among Baltic deputies. Never-
theless, as part of an attempt to build a sociological profile of Baltic deputies, the
survey did include questions on whether MPs had previously held local office and
to what extent they were also members of civic organisations.
In this regard it was apparent that Estonian deputies had much stronger links
to local politics than their Latvian and Lithuanian colleagues. Nearly three-quarters
of Estonian parliamentarians had had some level of local political experience. The
involvement of deputies in civic organisations was similarly quite widespread. Of
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course, both of these factors were compounded by the fact that the three Baltic
states are very small: together they total just 7.5 million people; roughly 1.4 million
in Estonia, 2.4 million in Latvia and 3.5 million in Lithuania. Therefore, their politi-
cians are likely to be active in numerous different ways given that the countries’ elite
bases are also small. Nevertheless, to the extent that such sociological givens were
compounded by other political rules (such as dual office-holding), it is possible to
clearly identify areas where institutional engineering was a factor in broader politi-
cal processes.
Party pressures13
As legislators, MPs must operate within the political scope of their party faction
while also adhering more broadly to the positions of their national party hierarchy.
In most cases, MPs are therefore bound to the party in a number of ways, starting
with electoral nomination, but also including committee appointments in parlia-
ment and factional membership where conflicts arise. This section presents an as-
sessment of the roles of MPs based on answers to different survey questions.14
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13 This section draws on Pettai et. al. [2000].
14 Again, from a methodological point of view it is impossible to fully assess candidate re-
cruitment and selection patterns based on a survey sample of MPs, as the data are skewed to
Table 3. ‘Have you ever also held local office?’ (%)
Estonia         Latvia        Lithuania    Baltic average
1. Yes 74.6 46.5 50.4 56.1
2. If yes, please indicate the type 
of post:
a) Local council member 96.2 78.8 78.8 85.4
b) Mayor 0 9.1 17.3 8.8
c) Other 3.8 12.1 3.8 5.8
Table 4. ‘Have you ever been a member of a professional association, labour union, 
church organisation or other group?’ (%)
Estonia         Latvia        Lithuania    Baltic average
1. Yes 69.0 77.5 73.5 73.3
2. If yes, did you at any time hold 
a formal position in that 
organisation?
a) Yes 63.3 78.2 70.2 70.7
The career of an MP invariably begins with his/her initial foray into the elec-
toral competition. However, this process involves two important intermediary
stages, both of which are influenced centrally by constraints set by the MPs’ politi-
cal party. MPs must first be recruited, and then suitably ranked on a party’s electoral
list in order to sustain a legislative career from term to term. In the survey we
queried deputies about their particular experiences in this regard. In addition, in or-
der to see who has control over an MP’s appointment and removal from parliamen-
tary committees this section also examines the legislative level. Here again the par-
ty may establish constraints on an MP’s career and therefore influence his/her be-
haviour. 
Governance arrangements regulating electoral and legislative careers fall rough-
ly into three categories. They can either be: 
• autocratic, by concentrating decision-making in the hands of national leaders, 
• democratic, by devolving the decisions to formal, democratically constituted par-
ty organs, or 
• pluralistic, if decisions result from an informal bargaining process among differ-
ent constituent groups within a party. 
As the following analysis shows, most Baltic deputies must reckon with party
structures that can readily be described as autocratic. At the same time, exceptions
exist in each Baltic country; thus autocratic party governance does not seem to be
an inevitable constraint for MPs in consolidating democracies. 
Tables 5 to 7 summarise the different electoral control patterns as described
by our parliamentarian respondents. To simplify the analysis somewhat, the three
governance categories are further delineated based on the spread of their means. In
autocratic parties, national leaders dominate both the recruitment and the ranking of
candidates. Moreover, the margin by which respondents judge the influence of na-
tional leaders to be greater than that of party conferences or local leaders must be
at least 0.3 points greater. In pluralistic parties, national leaders either do not exert si-
multaneous control over recruitment and ranking or they do so by a very small mar-
gin (<0.3). In such parties, the fate of electoral career changes is determined through
bargaining among national leaders, local party officials, and the party congress. Fi-
nally, in democratic parties, party conferences will be more important than national
or local leaders in determining both electoral career stages. 
The tables show that in most instances Baltic party leaders exert a dispropor-
tionate influence over both the recruitment and ranking of MPs as candidates.15
Party congresses also have marginally more control than local party leaders espe-
cially when it comes to ranking. However, these general features also vary some-
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the extent that they only include winners at the polls. Any such study would require a broad-
er sample including all candidates for election. In this instance, however, the survey data are
presented in order to describe the situation of those candidates who made it into parliament
and how this background experience may influence their subsequent behavior as MPs.
15 This agrees with other research done in Estonia by Kangur [2004].
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Table 5. Electoral career governance in Estonia, Mean (N)
Governance type Recruitment controlled by…
Party                                              … national            … party                 ... local 
leaders              conference              leaders
1. Autocratic
Coalition Party 1.5 (4) 3.5 (4) 1.8 (4)
United People’s Party 1.6 (5) 2.3 (6) 2.8 (5)
Moderates 1.5 (8) 2.0 (7) 2.4 (7)
Reform Party 2.0 (11) 2.6 (9) 2.5 (11)
Sub-average (43.8%) 1.7 2.5 2.4
2. Pluralistic
Centre Party 2.1 (20) 2.3 (18) 2.3 (19)
Sub-average (31.3%) 2.1 2.3 2.3
3. Democratic
Fatherland Union 2.0 (11) 1.9 (11) 2.1 (11)
People’s Union 2.0 (5) 1.5 (6) 2.0 (6)
Sub-average (25%) 2.0 1.8 2.1
Total: 1.9 (64) 2.2 (61) 2.3 (63)
Governance type Ranking controlled by…
Party                                              … national            … party                 ... local 
leaders              conference              leaders
1. Autocratic
Coalition Party 1.3 (4) 3.0 (4) 2.5 (4)
United People’s Party 1.2 (5) 2.7 (6) 2.8 (5)
Moderates 1.5 (8) 2.0 (6) 2.8 (5)
Reform Party 1.7 (11) 3.0 (10) 2.5 (11)
Sub-average (43.8%) 1.5 2.7 2.6
2. Pluralistic
Centre Party 1.7 (18) 2.2 (19) 2.2 (20)
Sub-average (31.3%) 1.7 2.2 2.2
3. Democratic
Fatherland Union 1.5 (11) 1.5 (11) 2.5 (11)
People’s Union 2.0 (5) 1.7 (6) 2.0 (6)
Sub-average (25%) 1.7 1.5 2.4
Total: 1.6 (62) 2.1 (62) 2.4 (62)
Note: 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.
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Table 6. Electoral career governance in Latvia, Mean (N)
Governance type Recruitment controlled by…
Party                                              … national            … party                 ... local 
leaders              conference              leaders
1. Autocratic
Socialist Party 1.3 (4) 2.8 (4) 1.8 (4)
People’s Party 1.9 (17) 2.6 (18) 2.5 (17)
Equal Rights 1.0 (4) 3.0 (4) 2.3 (4)
Social Democrats 2.1 (13) 2.6 (13) 2.5 (13)
Sub-average (54.3%) 1.8 2.7 2.4
2. Pluralistic
Latvia’s Way 1.9 (10) 2.0 (10) 2.2 (10)
Harmony Party 2.3 (3) 2.3 (3) 3.7 (3)
New Party 2.3 (3) 2.3 (3) 2.7 (3)
Sub-average (25.7%) 2.1 2.3 2.5
3. Democratic (20%)
Fatherland and Freedom 2.3 (14) 2.1 (14) 2.7 (14)
Total 2.0 (70) 2.5 (71) 2.5 (70)
Governance type Ranking controlled by…
Party                                              … national            … party                 ... local 
leaders              conference              leaders
1. Autocratic
Socialist Party 1.3 (4) 3.5 (4) 3.8 (4)
People’s Party 1.9 (16) 3.6 (17) 2.9 (17)
Equal Rights 1.3 (4) 3.3 (4) 1.8 (4)
Social Democrats 2.5 (13) 3.0 (12) 2.6 (13)
Sub-average (54.3%) 1.9 3.4 2.8
2. Pluralistic
Latvia’s Way 2.1 (10) 2.9 (10) 2.4 (10)
Harmony Party 2.3 (3) 3.7 (3) 3.0 (3)
New Party 2.0 (3) 2.7 (3) 2.3 (3)
Sub-average (25.7%) 2.2 3.1 2.6
3. Democratic (20%)
Fatherland and Freedom 2.7 (14) 2.6 (14) 3.0 (14)
Total 2.2 (69) 3.1 (69) 2.8 (70)
Note: Only parties with at least 3 respondents shown. Sub-averages, however, include all
respondents. 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.
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Table 7. Electoral career governance in Lithuania, Mean (N)
Governance type Recruitment controlled by…
Party                                              … national            … party                 ... local 
leaders              conference              leaders
1. Autocratic 
Homeland Union 1.7 (51) 2.8 (45) 2.4 (46)
Centre Union 1.7 (13) 2.8 (13) 2.5 (13)
Sub-average (61.3%) 1.7 2.8 2.4
2. Pluralistic
Social Democrats 2.3 (7) 2.9 (7) 2.6 (7)
Dem. Labour Party 1.8 (11) 2.1 (11) 2.2 (11)
Sub-average (18.9%) 2.0 2.4 2.3
3. Democratic
Christian Dem. Party 2.1 (11) 2.1 (10) 2.6 (11)
Sub-average (19.8%) 2.1 2.1 2.4
Total: 1.9 (106) 2.4 (99) 2.3 (101)
Governance type Ranking controlled by…
Party                                              … national            … party                 ... local 
leaders              conference              leaders
1. Autocratic 
Homeland Union 1.4 (51) 2.9 (46) 2.9 (46)
Centre Union 1.3 (12) 2.8 (12) 2.3 (12)
Sub-average (61.3%) 1.4 2.9 2.7
2. Pluralistic
Social Democrats 2.6 (7) 2.1 (7) 2.7 (7)
Dem. Labour Party 1.9 (10) 1.9 (10) 2.6 (10)
Sub-average (18.9%) 2.1 2.0 2.6
3. Democratic
Christian Dem. Party 1.9 (10) 1.9 (10) 2.9 (10)
Sub-average (19.8%) 1.9 1.7 2.8
Total: 1.8 (102) 2.2 (98) 2.7 (97)
Note: Only parties with at least 4 respondents shown. Sub-averages, however, include all
respondents. 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.
what between the three countries. For instance, Lithuania could be characterised as
the most autocratic party system, with 61.3% of respondents belonging to autocrat-
ic parties, compared to 54.3% in Latvia and 43.8% in Estonia. Lithuania also has the
smallest percentage of respondents (19.8%) who belong to democratic parties, com-
pared to 25.7% in Latvia and 25% in Estonia. Nonetheless, these national figures
must be disaggregated, as they conceal what are in reality important cross-party dif-
ferences. For instance, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the Democratic
Labour Party (LDLP) or the communist successor party belong to the pluralistic cat-
egory in Lithuania. Especially when compared to Latvia’s successor parties (the So-
cialist Party and Equal Rights), the LDLP seems to have been quite successful in
shedding any Leninist legacies inherited from Soviet times. Similarly counterintu-
itive is the inclusion of Estonia’s Centre Party in the pluralistic camp, as its leader,
Edgar Savisaar, is widely considered to be relatively autocratic.16 Nonetheless, ac-
cording to the party’s 20 respondents, control over electoral careers is fairly evenly
distributed among its different constituent groups. This may be a reflection of the
fact that the party is also one of Estonia’s largest (with roughly 7600 members), which
may mean that broadly based participation (or at least a sense of such participation)
is more likely. It is interesting to note also that in Latvia the strongly nationalist Fa-
therland and Freedom Party ultimately constitutes the country’s only ‘democratic’
party. Here one explanation may be that the party began as a coalition of nationalist
groups in 1993 and may have retained a consensual style of decision-making ever
since. Finally, one important fact that is not reported in the tables is the marginal in-
fluence that interest groups have on electoral careers in all three countries. Respon-
dents generally rated the influence of interest groups on recruitment and ranking
somewhere between ‘weak control’ and ‘no control’. Therefore, political parties in
the Baltics do not appear to be vehicles for special interest groups. Whether this is to
be taken as an indicator of the strength of party autonomy, or of the underdevelop-
ment of interest groups, or both, is a question that must be studied further.
MPs’ careers (and the constraints upon them) extend well beyond a successful
electoral candidacy. In the legislative arena, committee appointments, promotions
to legislative executive office and even selection to cabinet posts provide important
advancement opportunities. Control over these opportunities therefore constitutes
another key determinant in the behaviour of MPs. At the same time, electoral and
legislative behavioural constraints differ in a number of respects. First, the actors in
the legislative arena differ from those at the electoral career stage. Decisions about
legislative careers are usually brokered between party leaders, faction chairs, and
regular faction members. Local party leaders or party conferences rarely if ever are
involved at this career stage. Second, legislative career control does not offer quite
the same leverage as control over electoral careers because it involves making deci-
sions about career advances rather than deciding whether or not a party member will
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16 Indeed, in 2004 a major rift in the party opened up when a total of eight MPs split from
the party’s faction in the Riigikogu, complaining specifically about Savisaar’s leadership
style.
actually have a career. Legislative career control thus constitutes a secondary, com-
plementary type of leverage. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile examining, as it intro-
duces an important additional facet of MP behaviour. Depending on given patterns
of legislative career control we can draw inferences about whether the faction chair,
the party board, or the faction itself controls committee appointments. In the sur-
vey deputies were asked to assess the influence that different actors (including
themselves) have on their final committee appointment in parliament and express
their answer on the same four-point scale used in the previous question (ranging
from 1, ‘full control’, to 4, ‘no control’).
As Table 8 reveals, the legislative career patterns in all three countries differ
notably from their electoral counterparts. First, a horizontal look at the rows shows
few country-specific legislative control patterns, since faction chairs, party boards
and factions themselves exert more or less the same level of influence in each coun-
try. Similarly, a vertical glance at the country columns reveals a fairly undifferenti-
ated picture. For example, party boards are not surprisingly rated as having the least
influence. In this respect, the Baltic countries differ little from most other democra-
cies in which extra-parliamentary party organs usually have little control over leg-
islative careers. However, what is surprising is the small difference between factions
and faction chairs. Typically, one of the two has more control over committee ap-
pointments than the other. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, however, the two are
rated as having virtually the same level of influence. Moreover, since the standard
deviation for each individual party (not reported in this table) is very small, we can
guess that this is perhaps even an institutional phenomenon. 
The absence of any legislative control pattern is evident from the last row in
Table 8 and from Table 9. In Table 8 we can see that ultimately the personal prefer-
ence of deputies constituted the most important factor in determining committee
appointments among the survey respondents. Legislative career choices would thus
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Table 8. ‘Based on your experience, please assess the influence that the following
groups/individuals had on your committee appointment?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia          Latvia        Lithuania   Baltic average
1. Faction 2.25 2.20 2.36 2.28
(0.77) (0.92) (0.93) (0.89)
2. Party board 2.58 2.76 2.87 2.76
(0.91) (0.98) (1.02) (0.98)
3. Faction chair 2.40 2.07 2.65 2.43
(0.76) (0.83) (0.84) (0.85)
4. Personal preference 1.86 1.54 1.95 1.81
(0.77) (0.77) (0.76) (0.78)
Note: 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.
appear to be somewhat self-selective. Table 9 shows that when deputies were asked
what would happen if they consistently voted against their faction’s political posi-
tion, an overwhelming majority of respondents in all three countries replied that (at
least at the time of this survey) they would face only minor sanctions, if anything at
all. This is on top of the fact that deputies had more than one option to choose from.
Given that in most democracies defiance of party leaders in legislative votes is con-
sidered a serious offence and is likely to jeopardise a deputy’s career prospects this
finding is significant [Bowler, Farrel and Katz 1999]. Nevertheless, the most com-
monly reported sanction in the survey was a warning or a slap on the wrist. Only in
Lithuania did deputies rate the likelihood of expulsion or a denial of promotions as
significant; and in this particular case a cross-tabulation by party showed that many
of these deputies were from the Homeland Union, which probably reflected the fact
that HU deputies (Laima Andrikiene and Vidmantas Ziemelis) had been expelled
from the party in 1999.
Voter assistance
Central to the efficacy of parliamentary government is not only the democratic elec-
tion of legislators, but also the responsiveness of these legislators to citizen inputs and
demands. Such links between MPs and their direct constituents have been extensive-
ly studied in Western democracies [Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987], but much less
so in Central and Eastern European countries. In the given survey, five questions were
particularly designed to assess the degree to which Baltic deputies come into regular
contact with their voters and how much they pursue efforts to directly assist such cit-
izens. Beginning with a simple question about how often MPs are asked to intervene
on behalf of a constituent in some personal government manner (Table 10), it is read-
ily apparent that deputy-voter relations are strongest in Lithuania. 
Not only do Lithuanian deputies seem to be comparatively inundated with
voter requests, but they also appear in many cases to have factored this into their fu-
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Table 9. ‘If on a frequent basis or on a crucial plenary or committee vote you were to defy
your party’s voting instructions, what would be the most likely sanction you
would face? [Please tick all appropriate responses.]’ (%) (N)
Estonia           Latvia          Lithuania
a) Expulsion 0 (0) 6 (4) 14.8 (16)
b) No re-nomination 14.9 (10) 6 (4) 3.7 (4)
c) No promotion 3.0 (2) 9.0 (6) 26.9 (29)
d) Committee removal 1.5 (1) 0 (0) 5.6 (6)
e) Warning 62.7 (45) 64.2 (43) 42.6 (46)
f) Nothing 37.3 (25) 22.4 (15) 39.8 (43)
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Table 10. ‘In an average month, how often are you asked by a district voter to intervene
on his or her behalf in a governmental agency?’ (%)
Estonia          Latvia        Lithuania    Baltic average
a) Rarely 38.0 16.9 4.4 17.3
b) 1-4 times 46.5 49.3 24.8 37.6
c) 5-10 times 14.1 16.9 21.2 18.0
d) 10+ times 4.5 16.9 49.6 27.1
Table 11. ‘If you provide individual voters with bureaucratic assistance, do you intend 
to remind them at election time of your help?’ (%)
Estonia          Latvia        Lithuania    Baltic average
a) Yes 9.9 14.9 32.7 21.1
b) No 90.1 85.1 68.3 78.9
Table 12. ‘Could you tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements
about the work of members of parliament?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia          Latvia        Lithuania    Baltic average
a) Solving voters’ problems is one 
of the most worthwhile parts 
of my job.
2.35 2.00 2.20 2.18
(0.60) (0.70) (0.73) (0.70)
b) An MP who actively looks after 
voter interests can increase his/her 
chances of being re-elected.
2.02 1.66 1.87 1.85
(0.57) (0.48) (0.64) (0.59)
c) Members spend too much time 
looking after the interests of their 
voters, thereby neglecting national 
interests or problems.
3.00 2.91 2.71 2.85
(0.59) (0.72) (0.72) (0.69)
d) MPs are elected to serve national 
interest rather than to resolve 
voters’ problems.
1.99 2.33 2.40 2.25
(0.83) (0.93) (0.77) (0.83)
1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree.
ture electoral strategy. At the same time, when asked how often they act on a voter
request, an average of 56% of all Baltic deputies answered ‘always’ and 40% ‘some-
times’. 
In this respect, it is worth looking at the same issue in a more direct manner.
In the survey, Baltic MPs were asked to express their opinion regarding four inter-
related statements about the need to deal with voter problems. As Table 12 shows,
it is to be expected that the first two statements exhibit lower means in order to re-
flect the agreement with the statement (1 = fully agree). The other two statements
represent the converse attitude, signifying a higher mean. The results again show
Lithuanian deputies are slightly more inclined to pay attention to voter affairs, al-
though Latvian MPs also demonstrate a ready belief in the merits of such action
(Row b). 
District interests
Although MPs may often be careful to address the constituent concerns that reach
them directly, a more effective way of winning votes comes from assisting an entire
district or region. In this regard the survey asked to what extent MPs strive to pro-
vide collective goods to their constituencies, either through budgetary allocations
(‘pork’) or legislative amendments. Naturally, it may be somewhat fanciful to try
and apply the US models of ‘home-style’ politics to post-communist countries.
Moreover, as will be discussed in the final section, this particular phenomenon of
district representation is closely linked to the type of electoral system and the spe-
cific use of plurality voting. Nonetheless, as presumably rational actors, Central and
Eastern European MPs map also be expected to care for certain kinds of regional or
district interests.
Indeed, as the results indicate, Baltic MPs are by no means indifferent to their
constituencies and their well-being. A solid majority felt that benefiting their con-
stituency is part of their job. At the same time, when it comes to actually acting up-
on such duties, most deputies admit that they are able to deal with such things on-
ly occasionally or rarely. A comparison of the Baltic states in this regard shows that
it is now the Latvian MPs who lead the pack, with a considerably higher sense of re-
sponsibility to get pork for their districts. Their mean score of 1.7 in Table 13 repre-
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Table 13. ‘During the annual debate over the state budget (or supplementary state bud-
gets), how much do you feel it is your responsibility to try and get aid and/or 
government projects allocated that specifically benefit your district?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia            Latvia           Lithuania    Baltic average
2.34 1.70 2.29 2.13
(0.57) (0.60) (0.59) (0.65)
1 = Very often, 4 = Never.
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Table 14. ‘During the process of adopting the state budget (or a supplementary state 
budget), how often do you attempt to influence the process in order to provide
projects or money for your district?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia            Latvia           Lithuania     Baltic average
2.83 2.67 3.17 2.92
(0.76) (0.72) (0.73) (0.76)
1 = Very often, 4 = Never.
Table 15. ‘During an average parliamentary session, how often do you seek to alter other 
legislative acts in order to benefit your district?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia            Latvia           Lithuania     Baltic average
3.13 3.06 3.48 3.25
(0.68) (0.63) (0.61) (0.68)
1 = Very often, 4 = Never.
Table 16. ‘How many times per month do you go back to your district?’ (%)
Estonia          Latvia        Lithuania   Baltic average
a) 1-3 times 23.2 35.2 63.8 43.2
b) 4-6 times 31.9 40.8 24.5 31.6
c) 7+ 44.9 23.9 11.7 25.2
Table 17. ‘How do you keep in touch with your constituency? 
(Please tick all appropriate responses.)’ (%)
Estonia            Latvia          Lithuania
a) I hold regular constituency meetings. 21.0 64.8 61.1
b) I use my party’s legislative staffers 
to respond to constituent problems. 42.3 63.4 63.7
c) I attend local events (fairs, gatherings, concerts). 80.3 70.4 62.8
d) I write articles in the local newspaper. 54.9 71.8 46.9
e) I appear on local TV and radio. 33.8 70.4 37.2
f) I have too little time to maintain contact 
with my constituency. 5.6 0.0 3.5
sents a significant number of deputies (36.6%) who felt that such behaviour was a
‘very important’ responsibility of theirs. Similarly, Latvian concern for district in-
terests is reflected in the significant number of trips deputies make back to the dis-
trict (see Table 16). Latvian MPs also professed a broader range of ways in which
they maintain public contact with their district (see Table 17). Not a single Latvian
deputy in the survey claimed that they had too little time to keep in touch with their
district.
Interest group politics
As already noted in the discussion of party activities and the ranking of electoral
candidates, the direct influence of interest groups appears to be small in Baltic pol-
itics. Naturally, this does not mean that particularistic interests do not find their way
into political processes or that their influence is not felt in other ways. Moreover, it
would be naïve to think that an MP survey such as this could reveal reliably or open-
ly the extent of such influence. The following assessment of the survey questions
that dealt with these issues should therefore be taken with a grain of salt – espe-
cially as it pertains to the absolute level of interest influences. In the survey Baltic
MPs generally responded that during an average legislative period they only ‘occa-
sionally’ or even ‘rarely’ help businesses, interest groups or campaign sponsors in
various of governmental affairs (Table 18). 
While this correlates with the responses to the question in Table 2 about the
amount of time MPs spend meeting with interest groups, it raises questions about
how policy is then really made. Are Baltic parliaments procedurally more regulated
so that interest groups are only able to meaningfully influence policy decisions
through the executive branch or at the level of parliamentary committee chairs (who
decide the passage of bills)? Obviously a great deal of policy is decided at the level
of decrees and regulations prepared by ministerial officials. However, in each of the
Baltic states deputies also have the right to submit private members’ bills and
amendments, which should provide some inroads for interest groups to influence
legislation. 
Another indication of how limited the scope of interest group influence on
Baltic MPs may be is given in Table 19. When asked to cite some of the ways in
which they have helped interest groups, deputies did not appear to give preference
to any particular form, whether it was contacting a ministerial official or taking di-
rect legislative action. Again it is possible that interest groups themselves have not
yet had extensive access to average deputies. However, anecdotal evidence suggests
that amendments and ministerial contacts may be more prevalent.17
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der heavy media scrutiny when it turned out that a series of legislative amendments that she
had previously sponsored as a private MP coincided word-for-word with a draft proposed by
an interest group representing the pharmaceutical industry. Oviir claimed initially that the
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text was a coincidence, but the incident showed that interest group politics may flow pre-
cisely through such channels. Indeed, the incident also says something about MPs: they may
be incapable or may have insufficient time to formulate such amendments themselves, and
therefore ask interest groups to prepare ‘drafts’, which are then put into use without much
examination.
Table 18. ‘During an average legislative period, how often do you help businesses, interest
groups or campaign sponsors in a variety of governmental matters?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia            Latvia           Lithuania     Baltic average
2.99 2.76 2.75 2.92
(0.27) (0.71) (0.79) (0.67)
Table 19. ‘How often do you help such groups in the following ways?’ Mean, (SD)
Estonia          Latvia        Lithuania    Baltic average
a) I sponsor an amendment 
to the national budget. 3.20 3.01 3.11 3.12
(0.70) (0.68) (0.72) (0.70)
b) I sponsor an amendment 
to an existing law. 3.01 2.76 2.87 2.88
(0.58) (0.78) (0.74) (0.72)
c) I submit a request for information 
to a minister during Question Time. 2.79 2.80 2.66 2.74
(0.56) (0.86) (0.79) (0.75)
d) I contact a minister or a ministerial 
official personally on behalf 
of the group or its problem.
2.66 2.68 2.55 2.62
(0.56) (0.69) (0.77) (0.69)
e) I speak to other parliamentary 
colleagues on behalf of the groups 
or its problem.
2.52 2.37 2.61 2.51
(0.55) (0.74) (0.75) (0.70)
1 = Very often, 4 = Never.
General analysis
A number of hypotheses and questions arise when the data are analysed through
the prism of institutional and electoral theory. Given the fact that the three Baltic
electoral systems are so different, one is tempted to ask to what extent cross-coun-
try variations in the survey can be explained through institutional variables? In this
concluding discussion, the presumable consequences for MP behaviour based on
each of the electoral systems in the Baltic states will be posited and then compared
with the actual data presented above.
Of the three Baltic countries, Lithuania has the most voter-centred electoral
system, with 71 of the 141 members of the Seimas elected in single-member districts
that have a first-past-the-post balloting system. This means that at least half of
Lithuania’s MPs exhibit at least some of the district-centred behavioural tendencies
typical of the US Congress or the UK House of Commons – for example, caring
more actively for voter and district needs, developing more independent relations
from their parties. Indeed, in some respects, the survey’s sample size is even larger,
as the vast majority of Lithuanian deputies run in both an SMD and an MMD. This
means that even if in the previous election an MP was elected from the countrywide
MMD, he/she may still maintain close ties with a single-mandate district in the
hopes of retaining a mandate at the next election via an SMD victory. Nevertheless,
it is clear that only directly elected SMD deputies have an official status in relation
to their local constituencies, which MMD deputies can only imitate.
In the survey the sample was slightly skewed in favour of MMD deputies (58)
over SMD deputies (46). The range nonetheless allows us to make some correlative
analyses. To reiterate the point that was raised in the introduction to this article, the
SMD-MMD institutional distinction in Lithuania was not evident with regard to all
the variables where it may have been expected. For example, no statistically signif-
icant correlation could be discovered between district type and the ‘sense of re-
sponsibility to get pork for one’s district’. Similarly there appears to be no relation-
ship between district type and the four general statements on voter versus national
interest, which were presented in Table 12. Lithuanian deputies were the least fre-
quent visitors to their electoral districts (Table 16). Still, robust coefficients of 0.352
and 0.365 existed between the electoral district and how much time a deputy spent
at local meetings and on voter problems, respectively. In addition, SMD deputies are
more likely (by a coefficient of 0.310) to agree that ‘providing voter assistance im-
proves electoral chances’ or that ‘providing voter assistance improves independence
in parliament’ (0.259). SMD deputies also appear to receive many more voter re-
quests; thus it would seem that Lithuanian voters are also learning to distinguish
who is worth talking to with regard to political issues.
Voter care would seem to be a likely preoccupation also for Estonian MPs,
since based on Estonian electoral law they too run in fairly small districts, of which
there are relatively many (11 or 12, depending on the year). Indeed, this could be one
interpretation for why the Estonian MPs we interviewed tended to visit their dis-
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tricts more than their Latvian or Lithuanian counterparts. Yet in our survey these
visits seemed to consist mostly of attending local events (Table 17), and less so con-
stituency meetings or using staffers to respond to voter needs. With regard to the
latter issue, it is true that Estonian MPs also have fewer staff resources as allocated
by parliamentary rules. However, a second institutional factor deterring constituen-
cy ties comes into play through the electoral system: because Estonian MPs can al-
so be elected off of a national list (if they fail to gain the minimum amount of votes
in their district in order to be elected directly), they may frequently be more be-
holden to the party than to their voters during their subsequent parliamentary term.
In addition, previous research has shown that of those candidates eventually elect-
ed off of a national list, a disproportionate share ran their original campaigns in the
main cities of Tallinn and Tartu. Thus rural representation is diminished18 [Pettai
and Kreuzer 2001]. Also, Estonian voters seem to be equally complacent, as, given
the fact that about half of the seats during each election are allocated at the nation-
al level, most voters cannot clearly point to any MP as being their district represen-
tative. This phenomenon is reflected in the low number of voter requests that the
survey indicated Estonian deputies receive. Finally, Estonian MPs in general showed
a less particularistic and more ‘nationally-oriented’ attitude in relation to the four
statements on voter versus national interest in Table 12.
Latvian MPs stood out in the survey for their greater-than-expected attention
to district ‘pork’ and interest group politics. This is counterintuitive since the Lat-
vian electoral system (based on party-lists and five large electoral districts) should
make Latvian MPs more dependent on their party and should therefore detract
from overly particularistic behaviour. Certainly the fact that electoral candidates
have to fight for citizens’ preference votes in order to be actually elected may in-
crease their incentive to pay attention to constituent affairs. By the same token, be-
cause Latvian electoral candidates are allowed to run in more than one district at
once (i.e. they may simultaneously be on their party’s list in several districts), and
most top politicians follow this practice, they may never be sure about which dis-
trict they may end up being elected from, and therefore, as MPs, they may also not
have a clear connection to their ultimate ‘electoral district’. If a candidate is origi-
nally from one part of Latvia, but ends up being elected from another district (be-
cause of the vagaries of party-list totals or individual preference votes), he/she may
not even be in a position to actually serve the interests of that district. 
The Latvian case could draw our attention to the procedural rules that relate
to making budgetary and legislative amendments. For example, it may be that it is
easier for Latvian MPs to submit such bills in parliament, and that is why they re-
port engaging in this activity more. At the same time, the parliamentary rules in the
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18 Moreover, looking at a cross-tabulation of the geographic type of district (rural vs. urban)
and the number of times an MP returns home to his/her district, urban-district MPs were
much more likely to have returned home 7+ times. This means that in the case of MPs who
considered their district the capital, ‘returning home’ was no problem whatsoever. In other
words, the data regarding district visitations are skewed by these capital-based deputies.
Baltic states actually give the best hand to Estonian deputies, who are able to sub-
mit bills and amendments on their own and without to have more than one spon-
sor. In Latvia, by contrast, bills need to be sponsored by a minimum of five deputies.
This variable therefore remains a puzzle.
Conclusion
In legislative studies, there are a number of competing conceptual frameworks that
are used to make sense of parliamentary behaviour. In the context of consolidating
democracies, it is clear that factors related to historical legacies or inherited politi-
cal culture may have a lot to do with how parliamentarians act. For example, faced
with the task of strengthening embryonic democratic institutions, politicians may
commit themselves to more collective, national interests, rather than behaving in
opportunistic, self-interested ways, even if the institutions otherwise enable such
behaviour. Similarly, politicians may only slowly come to understand the incentives
embedded in the institutions or rules that they have chosen for their system, for
there is clearly a process of learning that goes on no matter how much politicians
may think they know what to expect from the rules they put in place. Indeed, at the
very least there will always be MPs who were not professional politicians when they
entered politics. These people may arrive with entirely different perceptions of life,
of society and of politics itself. So at least for an initial period of learning these
deputies will exhibit different types of behaviour than those who could more read-
ily be classified as professional politicians. 
All of these more distal variables (however difficult they may be to delineate)
require us therefore to take with some caution the effects that more proximate in-
stitutional variables might have on MP behaviour. The objective of this article was
to test (at least in a provisional manner) some of the hypotheses that institutional-
electoral theory provides us with on how MPs should behave based on certain types
of institutional-electoral rules. The results are somewhat inconclusive. Some of the
starkest differences between the three Baltic states in terms of electoral institutions
(e.g. Latvia’s simple PR system versus Lithuania’s mixed system) do pan out with re-
spect to certain aspects of parliamentarians’ self-reported behaviour and attitudes.
Others, however, do not. Returning to the argument about political learning, it is
possible that over time these remaining hypotheses may also be corroborated as
deputies simply learn what ‘rational behaviour’ means for them under the particu-
lar rules they work in. For that kind of definitive test, however, a data time-series
would be necessary. Consequently, the examination and explanation of different
patterns of parliamentarian behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe as yet remains
an emerging research area.
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